The safety science is trapped in the management concept that 'what gets measured gets done', and the belief that incidents rates are actually validly and reliably measuring safety performance. We give incentives based on false data, and we spend huge resources on misconceptions, achieving little more than looking very busy.
The more recent focus on the art of leadership, as against the 'science of management', has brought a deep and different understanding of people in the work place - that human motivation is a complex but powerful force that can be harnessed. The approach argues that if people are given authority and trust, they will excel. If people understand and believe in the true purpose of safety, they will sign up.
When it comes to promoting job-site safety, how much messaging is too much? How much risk-identification and management is too much? Is there such a thing as too many safety rules and guidelines? While most people argue that job-site safety can never be promoted enough, one safety-industry researcher suggests otherwise.
Corrie Pitzer argues that many organizations suffer from delusions when they think about safety. He suggests that by driving risk-identification and risk-management strategies, as well as promoting "unrealistic" goals such as zero accidents, safety managers unwittingly create organization-wide delusions that actually cause more harm than good.
Because Pitzer uses strong language to describe his approach, he's often characterized as not caring about ordinary men and women who risk injury or death in dangerous workplace situations. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, Pitzer and his team study traditional approaches to safety through unusual means, and the conclusions they draw are based on data gathered through years of careful study.
Analysis shows, quite clearly, that some of the modern approaches to workplace safety have fostered more harm than good. Although the approaches themselves are not without merit—it's reasonable to want to control risk, and it's laudable to want to reduce accident rates—as a society, we have arrived at a point where organizations drive such approaches harder than ever, to the point where these notions are being followed slavishly and without any regard to their broader consequences. According to the author, accidents are largely not preventable. As organizations are operating increasingly closer to 'zero', accidents are increasingly random events, caused by chance circumstances and inherent risks that randomly interact. Moreover, by creating illusions of compliance and consistency, where workers are encouraged to follow rules and procedures unquestioningly and without relying on their own common sense and instincts, safety systems can actually promote disaster.
The author describes seven deadly delusions from which organizations suffer.